In this paper, we test the hypothesis that access to electronic payments may reduce crime. Our results suggest that there is a negative and significant statistical relationship between access to electronic payments and the incidence of economic crimes such as robbery and burglary, while electronic transactions do little to reduce the incidence of non-economic crimes such as homicide and rape. This paper provides evidence that policies and technologies that enable the proliferation of cashless transactions have the desired impact of deterring crime.
Introduction
Over the past few years, several US government agencies have implemented programs designed to increase the use of electronic financial transactions in developing countries in order to reduce crime. In this paper, we estimate the impact of electronic financial transactions on economic crimes in a sample of 71 countries. Using data on point of sale devices and crime rates from 2004 to 2009, we find that an increase in point of sale devices of 1 per 1000 people leads to reduction in robbery of 2.2-5.6%. 3 Our findings suggest that, while no panacea for the physical insecurity that plagues poor or war-torn countries, proliferation of electronic financial transactions does indeed enhance public safety and that American efforts to promote electronic financial transactions overseas are well justified. 4 The first American attempt to promote electronic financial transactions as a means of enhancing security was a 2008 U.S. Department of Defense initiative to expand the use of electronic payments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The initiative, known as the ''Cashless Battlefield,'' involved shifting compensation of local suppliers and contractors from cash payments to ''mobile banking'' -a form of electronic financial transactions that exploits the cellular telephone network. One reason for this was to eliminate the logistic burden created by so-called ''jingle runs'' -vulnerable large-scale shipments of cash that had to be escorted through hostile territory. More important, however, was the belief that development of electronic financial transactions in Iraq and Afghanistan would http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2014.10.002 0167-6245/Published by Elsevier B.V.
complicate insurgent efforts to engage in robbery and extortion, thereby enhancing physical security. 5 The Cashless Battlefield has been followed by the ''Better than Cash Alliance,'' an initiative of the U.S. Agency for International Development that was launched in September 2012. The Better than Cash Alliance's formal goal is to ''empower people by accelerating the shift to electronic payments.'' One of the initiative's formal objectives is to enhance the physical security of often defenseless people who do not enjoy adequate legal or police protection and are routinely robbed of the cash they carry in their wallets or store in their homes and businesses. 6 In his remarks at the inauguration of the Better than Cash Alliance, US Agency for International Development administrator Rajiv Shah outlined a variety of initiatives that the Agency has mounted to promote electronic financial transactions -initiatives that clearly illustrate the ambitious nature of the Better than Cash Alliance:
In the Philippines, we're working with a range of public and private partners to transition 100 companies to epayroll. And I've personally offered President Aquino our support for their new commitment to electronic payments in government.
In Malawi, we are supporting the efforts of the government to shift 300,000 civil servant salaries from cash to mobile money-as well as transition over the nation's largest agricultural voucher program from paper to mobile delivery.
And in Afghanistan, we are delighted by the very recent news that they have made their own commitment to Better than Cash. We will continue to work closely with them to ensure more than 300,000 Afghans can pay their electricity bills from their phones-ultimately helping to drive more revenue to the utility company and expand electricity to 80 percent of Afghans that don't have access today.
Underpinning these efforts, we have also recently forged two new partnerships with Citi and Vodafone and Technoserve to reach a scale in mobile money previously unimaginable. This partnership will build on our work across the world, but especially in Haitiwhere we helped launch a mobile money revolution, expanding access to more than 800,000 people.
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Efforts like the Better than Cash Alliance and the Cashless Battlefield illustrate that US government agencies are deeply convinced of the efficacy of electronic payment technologies as a means to enhance physical security in poor and dangerous places. Surprisingly, however, very little is actually known about electronic financial transactions' impact on crime.
Until recently, much of the extensive dialogue on electronic financial transactions and crime has taken the form of estimates or anecdotes. Warwick (1993) , for example, forecasts that if the United States fully replaced the use of cash with electronic financial transactions ''it is plausible that at least 15% and as much as 40% of crime in general could be prevented.'' Meanwhile, an evaluation of the M-PESA mobile banking network in Kenya offers the following as evidence of the efficacy of electronic financial transactions in reducing crime:
One of our customers traveling from Nairobi to Kisumu deposited money with M-PESA and withdrew it at his destination instead of carrying cash -this is to combat the insecurity and theft on public transport. This behavior was also seen during the M-PESA pilot.
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To be sure, there is absolutely nothing wrong with estimates and anecdotes, but it is probably not good practice for major government agencies to divert considerable financial and managerial resources into initiatives inspired by the behavior of ''some guy who took a bus.'' Clearly, a more careful analysis of the relationship between electronic financial transactions and crime is required.
Our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the effect of electronic transactions on crime. Sections 3 and 4 describe our estimation strategy and data. In Section 5, we report our findings. Our results suggest that there is a negative and significant statistical relationship between electronic financial transactions and economic crimes such as robbery and burglary. In Section 6, we consider the possibility that our findings are the result of a spurious relationship and that some unidentified variable is driving both increased point of sale device penetration while reducing crime. To test for this, we evaluate the statistical relationship between electronic financial transactions and non-economic crimes such as homicide and rape. We find, reassuringly, that point of sale device proliferation has no impact on non-economic crime. Section 7 concludes the paper with a discussion of its implications for future research and development policy.
Cash and crime
In his seminal 1968 paper, ''Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,'' Gary Becker developed a model where rational agents choose to engage in crime if the expected return exceeds that legal economic activities can offer. While such an approach to crime is obviously unsuitable for understanding the motivations of serial killers or sexual predators, there is no doubt that a good portion of crime, particularly property crime such as robbery and burglary, is indeed motivated by straightforward economic considerations of risk and reward.
Following Becker (1968) , a very sizable literature developed that explored various aspects of the relationship between economics and crime. One line of research sought to identify the social and economic factors that made crime economically attractive, and focused on the roles that poverty, social equity, education, and demographics play in determining the level of crime. 8 See Vaughan (2007), p. 6. 9 For a good review of this literature, see Buananno (2003) .
A second line of research focused on identifying policies that could reduce the frequency and severity of criminal activity. This literature addresses a number of issues, including the effectiveness of deterrence and the impact of gun control, the legalization of abortion, and the prohibition of drug and alcohol consumption on crime rates.
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The impact of electronic financial transactions adoption on crime, and hence this paper, lies squarely within this second line of research.
Advocates of electronic payments as a means of enhancing physical security generally begin their analysis by noting that ''most street crime is committed either to obtain cash, or with cash used as a payment medium'' (Warwick, 1993) . Based on this, they offer two very different hypotheses for why electronic financial transactions should reduce the frequency and severity of criminal activity.
The first hypothesis is based on the observation that cash is an important input that facilitates organized criminal activity. In this argument, criminals value cash because of its anonymity and the absence of audit trails. The sums seized in raids on narcotics traffickers illustrate the importance of cash in criminal enterprises. For example, a 2008 raid in Mexico netted $205 million in U.S. currency.
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Given that organized criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, are clearly cash intensive, it stands to reason that if cash was no longer available, criminals would have no choice but to adopt electronic financial transactions for their transactions. Dependence on electronic financial transactions would, in turn, drive up their ''cost of doing business.'' As a result, some of the crimes they commit would no longer pay.
The second hypothesis focuses on the role of cash in street crime. Robbers, for example, do not hold up convenience stores in order to obtain snack food, but in order to ''empty the till.'' Electronic financial payment technology allows convenience stores to operate with less cash in the till. As a result, emptying the till is less attractive, and marginal holdups -those whose net benefits were small to begin with -may no longer be worthwhile to commit. This would lead to a decline in the aggregate rate of crime. Similar reasoning would hold for gas stations, liquor stores, and so on.
While both hypotheses regarding the relationship between physical cash and crime are entirely plausible, the first hypothesis cannot be tested empirically. Criminals need not shift to electronic financial transactions for their dealings as long as they can easily exploit cash as an alternative. The only way to force criminals into electronic financial transactions is to completely eliminate cash -something often referred to as a ''cashless economy: '' In order to dramatically reduce crime, the nation must become completely cashless. A mere reduction in the nation's cash supply, no matter how substantial, is insufficient. Even a relatively small amount of cash in circulation will sustain widespread crime. [Warwick, 1993] To date, no country has implemented a truly cashless economy, and hence there is no way to ascertain whether and to what degree the complete elimination of physical cash would reduce criminal activity.
While cash must be eliminated if criminals are to be forced into using electronic financial transactions, small businesses and individuals can eschew cash in favor of electronic transactions in order to protect themselves from crimes such as robbery and burglary. Hence, greater access to electronic financial transactions should straightforwardly lead to fewer robberies and thefts. Given that electronic financial transactions access varies widely among countries and over time, this hypothesis can certainly be evaluated using statistical methods.
The methodological approach of this paper places it in a small body of empirical literature on the cross-country determinants of crime. The foundational work of Fajnzylber et al. (2002a Fajnzylber et al. ( , 2002b ) treat crime as a dynamic process (using system-GMM models) and looked for robust determinants of aggregate crime rates. Their results suggest that economic factors play a significant role in determining the incidence of crime. Specifically they identified higher rates of inequality, GDP growth, and urbanization as factors that lead to high crime rates. Using similar methods, Neumayer 12 (2003, 2005) finds that the relationship between inequality and crime is fragile, and argues that sweeping policy changes, in addition to modernization, influence crime rates over a long time horizon. Lee and Shin (2011) reexamine the relationship between inequality and crime, focusing on the identification of better measures of inequality and use difference GMM and fixed-effects models to look at the impact of within-country variations in income inequality in 13 OECD countries.
Estimation strategy
We model economic crime as a function of electronic transactions, a set of country level control variables and an error term:
To account for fixed, unobserved country characteristics and common time shocks we extend the model to include constant country fixed effects and yearly time dummies:
where c i is a country specific error and l t controls for time related trends in or shocks on crime rates.
14 Graph 1 and regression estimation do not suggest a clear time trend for the period. We test for the appropriateness of including time dummy variables by testing the hypothesis that all year dummy variables are jointly equal to zero. In the case of robbery we accept the null, finding no significant time trend or shocks, but in the case of burglary we reject the null at the 1% level. Although only required for the burglary case,we follow Wooldridge's (2001) advice and include time dummies in all of our fixed effects and GMM models. With country fixed effects, our analysis is robust to unobserved factors that affect both electronic payments and crime that are fixed at the country level, such as bureaucratic red tape. This specification is also robust to dynamic shocks common across countries, such as global economic crises. We will overstate the relationship between electronic payments and crime if unobserved country-level factors associated with the spread of electronic payments also reduce crime. Of greatest concern here is the possibility that economic development could promote electronic financial transactions while reducing economic crime. 15 We use point of sale devices as a proxy for access to electronic financial transactions for a number of reasons. Most importantly, changes in point of sale devices are not correlated with changes in GDP per capita. 16 Other potential proxies such as changes in the number or aggregate value of card transactions or changes in the number of issued credit cards per capita are much more highly correlated with changes in GDP per capita as they more closely parallel changes in economic activity. Secondly, there are fewer observations available for alternative proxies. Thirdly, we reason that point of sale devices are a good proxy for the prevalence of electronic financial transactions because the devices are expensive. Hence, it is unlikely that merchants are purchasing or renting them unless offering customers the option of using electronic financial transactions confers a meaningful competitive advantage -something that would only be true if large numbers of customers are actually using credit or debit cards. Thus we initially rely on fixed effects models because we are interested in understanding the variation in crime within countries that results from the proliferation of point of sale devices, rather than the impact of cross-country variation in access to electronic financial transactions. However, we have an additional concern that crime levels may be highly persistent. We conducted the Wooldridge (2001) serial correlation test, and found that the crimes we examine in our study are strongly serially correlated with an ar(1) process indicating that a dynamic model is appropriate.
It is common in the literature exploring cross-country differences in crime to use lagged dependent variable models to address serial correlation in crime levels (Fajnzylber et al., 2002a (Fajnzylber et al., , 2002b Neumayer, 2005; Lee and Shin, 2011) . Following the literature, we follow Arellano and Bond (1991) in using the difference GMM, which takes the difference of all variables and uses all available lags of endogenous variables as instruments. For the GMM, we modify Eq. (2) to produce:
where b 1 R i,tÀ1 measures the impact of the lagged robbery or burglary on its present state.
While we include results for OLS and FE with lagged dependent variables as points of reference, OLS and FE estimators that include lagged dependent variables inherently suffer from endogeneity since the lagged dependent variable is systematically correlated with the error term. OLS and FE estimators of the lagged dependent variables provide an upper and lower bound for well behaved coefficients on lagged dependent variables.
In addition to our basic rationale for using fixed effects and difference GMM models -that they focus on the withincountry variation which we are interested in measuringthere are several additional reasons that fixed effects and difference GMM are most appropriate. Wooldridge (2001) and Roodman (2006) show that in situations where country-specific effects impact independent variables, random effects and system-GMM models are inconsistent, and it seems likely that the general level of national development influences independent variables such as urbanization, police per capita and the proliferation of electronic financial transactions. A final reason for choosing between system and difference GMM is stationarity, and using a Fisher test we find that crime rates and electronic financial transactions are all stationary in differences. Admittedly, using difference GMM comes at a price -we are giving up the extra variation we could exploit in system-GMM models.
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Graph 1. Trends in economic crime.
14 While a time trend can be included instead of the time dummy variables it unnecessarily forces the impact of time to be linear (Wooldridge, 2001) . 15 See for example Fajnzylber et al. (2002a Fajnzylber et al. ( , 2002b who find that economic growth is a significant detractor from economic crime. 16 We confirm this by regressing changes in point of sale devices on changes in GDP per capita. 17 To be on the safe side, we also ran system GMM models, but the resultant Hansen tests did not support the validity of the extra moment conditions.
Data
We use an unbalanced panel dataset of 70 countries over 6 years to estimate the impact of electronic transactions on robbery and burglary. Table 1 shows countries included in our analyses and years of data available for each country. Our panel includes 31 countries that the World Bank classifies as middle income and five countries it classifies as low income. Because of data limitations, only five countries in our sample come from sub-Saharan Africa.
Our data on per capita rates of robbery and burglary come from the United Nations Office on Crime and Drugs. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables that we use, including overall, between, and within-country statistics. The United Nations Office on Crime and Drugs dataset suffers from welldocumented bias caused by differences in reporting practices among countries (Fajnzylber et al., 2002a) . Our models control for this problem by focusing strictly on within-country variation using fixed effects and difference-GMM models.
Data on point of sale devices per capita come from the World Bank's 2010 report, Payment Systems Worldwide.
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In the GMM models we report results with this variable treated both as exogenous and endogenous. We include most of the common control variables from the literature cited above: the degree of urbanization, the unemployment rate, and per capita GDP measured in terms of purchasing power parity. These data are drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. We treat all of these variables as predetermined but not necessarily exogenous.
In several models we also use police per capita. Data for this variable are taken from the United Nations Office on Crime and Drugs database. In the GMM models where we include it, we treat police per capita as potentially endogenous, instrumenting for the variable using taxes as a share of population. This treatment follows the work of Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) who use taxes per capita to instrument for police and Lee and Shin (2011) who use taxes as a share of GDP.
Several other possible control variables, such as males as percentage of the population and female labor force participation, fluctuate too little within countries over the time period of this study to be useful, and hence are left out.
We compare changes in GDP against changes in point of sale devices and crime rates to examine whether underlying economic conditions are driving simultaneous increases in point of sale device use and decreases in economic crime. While we expect cross-country differences in development to be related to both electronic financial transactions and crime, GDP per capita would need to be related to the first differences of point of sale devices and robbery or burglary to be problematic for our analysis. Graphs 2 and 3 illustrate that while average level of development, as measured by GDP per capita, drives cross-country differences in device penetration, changes in GDP per capita are uncorrelated with changes in point of sale device adoption. Regression analysis similarly shows that first differences in GDP per capita do not significantly impact first differences in point of sale device penetration. There is, unsurprisingly, a significant and positive time trend in point of sale device use over the period; this trend persists despite changing underlying economic conditions 19 Graphs 4 and 5 show the underlying relationship between robbery and burglary and GDP per capita. Preliminary analysis suggests that wealthier countries have less of both and that changes in GDP per capita might reduce burglary but have no significant effect on robbery. We include GDP per capita in our models to control for this issue, but we are less concerned that changing economic conditions are driving our results because of their lack of effect on point of sale device proliferation and robbery. 
Results
In Tables 3-5 , we model the relationship of point of sale device penetration to robbery and burglary. In the preponderance of models, increased point of sale device penetration has a significant negative impact on these economic crimes. Table 3 presents our fixed-effects models of robbery and burglary. We present models with and without controls. In the models of robbery, point of sale devices are negative and significant at the 10% and 5% levels in models (1) and (2). An increase of 1 device per 1000 people is associated with between 3% and 4% drop in the robbery rate. In the burglary models, point of sale devices are significant at the 10% level in model (4) with control variables and insignificant in model (3) without controls. Here an increase of 1 device per 1000 people increase is associated with a 3% reduction in burglary. Referring back to Table 2 , within our sample, there are an average nine point of sale devices per 1000 people, though the number ranges from 0 to 60. Within countries, a standard deviation is a change of about two devices per 1000 people, therefore a one within- Graph 2. Average point of sale devices and GDP.
Graph 3. Point of sale device and GDP per capita, average differences.
Graph 4. Robbery and GDP per capita.
Graph 5. Burglary and GDP per capita.
country standard deviation change would account for a 6% to an 8% reduction in robbery or a 6% reduction in burglary. Table 4 shows dynamic models of robbery which imply a similar result: a 1 device per 1000 people increase in point of sale devices leads to a 2.2-5.6% reduction in robbery. Model (5), an OLS model, and model (6), a fixed effects model, give the approximate upper and lower bounds for the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable needed to evaluate the performance of the GMM models. Models (7)-(10) use a difference-GMM methodology. Following Roodman (2008) , who cautions that instrument proliferation can overfit endogenous variables and weaken Hansen tests in GMM models, we limit model (8) to the first 3 lags of the instruments for the lagged dependent variable. 20 In Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 20 High instrument counts, per Roodman (2006 Roodman ( , 2008 bias Hansen tests (for instrument validity) and difference-in-Hansen tests (for endogeneity). While rejecting the null in a Hansen test indicates valid instruments, a Hansen test with p-values of over 0.25 may indicate excessive instrument proliferation, and in such cases one may fail to reject null hypotheses that should be rejected in Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests. Therefore, we run our difference-in-Hansen tests on models where the instruments are restricted to two lags of the endogenous variables. We primarily include unconstrained models here because their instrument counts are lower than n, a crude rule of thumb.
model (9) we instrument for the first difference of point of sale devices with second and deeper lagged levels to control for potential point of sale device endogeneity, despite consistent findings of no endogeneity when point of sale devices are singled out in difference-in-Hansen tests. In model (10) we add police per capita as an explanatory variable.
In models (7)-(9), the effect of lagged point of sale devices is negative and significant at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels of confidence. In model (10), point of sale devices are not significant. Arguably, the change in the lagged dependent variable coefficient to outside the bounds the OLS and fixed effects models set and the insignificance of police per capita indicate that this specification is less preferable than those that omit police per capita. In models (7) and (9), the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable falls within the bounds the OLS and fixed effects models set, making these our preferable specifications. In these specifications, a one standard deviation change in point of sale device use would drive a 4.6% to an 11.2% reduction in crime.
In Table 5 , we substitute burglary for robbery as the dependent variable in our dynamic specifications and report similar results from the same six specifications. In model (13), the negative impact of point of sale devices is significant at the 99% level, and in the remaining dynamic models, including the specification that incorporates police per capita, it is significant at the 95% level of confidence. All models, except model (16) with police per capita included, are well behaved with their coefficients on the lagged dependent variable falling between the OLS and fixed effects coefficients.
At the high end, the impact of point of sale device proliferation is slightly smaller in the burglary than in the robbery models, with the estimated impact of an increase of 1 point of sale device per 1000 people resulting in a 2.2-4.4% reduction in burglary. Along these lines a one standard deviation increase in point of sale devices would result in 4.4-8.8% reduction in crime.
The lack of consistent results for control variables should not be regarded as surprising. Recent reviews of the empirical literature on crime, such as Buananno (2003) and Dills et al. (2010) , find that few of the variables regarded as important in this literature have proven to have a consistent or robust relationship with changes in the level of crime. Dills et al. (2010) concludes that ''economists know little about the main factors identified in the economics of crime literature as key determinants of crime. Even hypotheses that find some support in U.S. data for recent decades are inconsistent with data over longer horizons or across countries.'' Along these lines, results for Police per capita are negative and insignificant.
21 This is similar to Lee and Shin (2011) who find that although police per capita are a significant determinant of crime rates across states in the US, they are insignificant across countries.
Robustness
We consider two outstanding issues that might give rise to concern about the robustness of our conclusions. First we consider the issue of spurious correlation and the possibility that some other mechanism is both driving point of sale device proliferation and reducing crime. Second we look at whether the results hold across countries at different levels of development, an attempt to rule out the issue that electronic financial transactions adoption and crime reduction are conditioned on initial levels of GDP. While we cannot rule out either issue in its entirety, these tests give credence to the idea that the proliferation of point of sale devices is driving down crime.
To rule out the possibility of spurious correlation, we explore the possibility that some other mechanism promotes point of sale device proliferation while discouraging crime in general. If electronic financial transactions are promoted because of high crime rates they may be simply acting as a proxy for other crime-fighting measures, and we would expect that these other measures are likely to reduce non-financial crime. If, on the other hand, point of sale devices are discouraging criminals because stores and individuals have less cash on hand, their proliferation should have little or no impact on rates of murder and rape. To examine this hypothesis, we substitute murder and rape for robbery and burglary as dependent variables. Data on per capita rates of murder and rape are taken from the UNOCD database.
In Table 6 , we report the results of difference-GMM models for murder and rape. We reassuringly find no significant relationships between access to point of sale devices and murder or rape. In the case of one of the murder models, and two of the rape models, the estimated coefficient on point of sale devices is not only insignificant but positive.
Turning to the second issue, our initial modeling efforts took into account the basic issues that GDP per capita might be related both to crime rates and electronic financial transactions proliferation. Fixed effects and difference models largely eliminate the issue because changes in GDP are uncorrelated with changes in robbery and burglary. We also chose point of sale device proliferation as our proxy for electronic financial transactions as changes in point of sale device use is unrelated to changes in GDP.
Still, one might be concerned that the initial level of GDP per capita could shape both changes in crime rates and changes in point of sale device proliferation. The rates of diffusion of technology may be different depending on economic conditions (e.g. Andres et al., 2010) We test for this, regressing the first differences of robbery, burglary, and point of sale devices on the initial level of GDP per capita. Our results suggest that while changes in robbery are not shaped by initial levels of GDP per capita, changes in point of sale device proliferation and burglary are. Specifically this means that the conditioning effect should be a non-issue in the robbery models but there could be a potential bias in burglary models.
This conditioning is implicitly controlled for using fixed effects and difference GMM. Still, to test whether somehow our result stems from trends set in motion by initial levels of development we compare Fixed Effects models across income groups. 22 Although somewhat rudimentary, the analysis in Table 7 suggests that although the impact of point of sale devices is larger for low income countries, these conditions are not driving the relationship.
Conclusion
As a whole we interpret our results as meaningful evidence that there is a negative, significant, and robust relationship between greater access to electronic financial transactions and lower incidence of economic crime, and that the lessened vulnerability that electronic financial transactions offer drives this relationship.
Going forward, new technologies assure that access to electronic financial transactions will accelerate. It is quite easy to enable fourth generation ''smart phones'' to effectively function as both a credit/debit card and a point of sale device. Every individual with an iPhone or Blackberry can conduct electronic transactions with any other similarly equipped individual. As Kenya's M-PESA mobile banking system has demonstrated, even relatively unsophisticated mobile phones can provide a means of payment, albeit less elegantly.
In China, electronic financial transactions are proliferating in remote rural areas through a novel system that converts regular land-line phones into hybrid ''transfer telephones.'' In describing the advantage of using such phones as a means of paying farmers for deliveries of chili peppers, a processor explained that ''it's faster and more convenient for customers and it promotes public safety. You're not at risk of being stabbed for your money. '' 23 There are even technologies that make it possible to conduct electronic transactions in remote regions where there is no connectivity to the Internet or to mobile phone service. The South African Social Security Administration, for example, currently distributes millions of social grants using a system that relies on biometrics and smart cards coupled with point of sale devices, making it feasible to engage in electronic payments literally in the middle of nowhere.
The nascent global boom in electronic financial transactions access could prove to be a transformative event in less developed countries and poorer communities. These are the places where ''cash crimes,'' such as muggings and holdups, are most ubiquitous -often so common that it becomes impossible to conduct even the most mundane forms of commerce. The results reported in this paper suggest that widespread access to electronic financial transactions has the potential to greatly enhance personal security in these areas. New technologies could enable far more widespread access. This, in turn, could unleash a great deal of industry and commerce, resulting in a significant improvement in standards of living. As such, we conclude that the evidence so far suggests that it makes sense for aid agencies and development institutions to promote electronic financial transactions through initiatives like US Agency for International Development's Better Than Cash Alliance. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 22 Adding control variables and using GMM models require additional degrees of freedom that are unavailable when we limit the samples. 23 Dinny McMahon, A Way to Pay in Rural China, Wall Street Journal, 10
